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ABSTRACT
Despite a considerable interest in the effects of polls 
published during election campaigns, we know little 
about how well people internalize and remember their 
results. This paper studies how accurately citizens recall 
poll results and factors potentially influencing this accu-
racy. Theoretically, we draw on research into the percep-
tion of polls and poll effects as well as into media effects 
on political knowledge in general. Empirically, we inves-
tigate recall accuracy based on a representative tele-
phone survey conducted two weeks prior to the 2013 
German national election. Respondents demonstrated 
reasonable accuracy in remembering poll results, when 
they had been exposed to them, and this did not tend to 
improve drastically with more exposure. Only in the case 
of recalling the relative poll ranks as opposed to vote 
shares was more exposure associated with better recall. 
Politically knowledgeable individuals were consistently 
better at recalling the polls, but greater interest in the 
election did not improve recall beyond this.
Polls have become an integral part of election coverage over recent decades. 
This trend has been observed in various democracies, including the USA 
(Traugott, 2005), Germany (Brettschneider, 2008), Israel (Shaefer et al., 
2008), Sweden (Strömbäck, 2009), and Italy (Roncarolo, 2008). Since the first 
scientific polls were published in the 1930s, researchers have been particularly 
interested in their effects on voters’ attitudes and behavior (Hardmeier, 2008; 
Moy & Rinke, 2012). The bandwagon (Barnfield, 2019) and underdog effects 
(Lee, 2011) are two prominent examples of such behavioral effects. Moreover, 
polls shape subjective predictions about the outcome of an election, even when 
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other factors, like the general tone of political media coverage, political pre-
ferences, and perceived opinions in people’s personal social environments are 
controlled for (Zerback et al., 2015). Despite this considerable interest in poll 
effects, our knowledge of how they come about is still quite limited, although 
more recent work has also focused on the perception and assessment of polls 
(e.g., Madson & Hillygus, 2020). For example, Mutz (1997) asserts a need for 
understanding the social psychological processes behind poll effects since the 
majority of empirical studies only focus on behavioral outcomes of poll 
exposure, particularly participation in elections and voting decisions.
Theoretically we should expect that any influence polls might have would 
rely on at least three prerequisites (Zaller, 1992). First, voters would have to be 
exposed to polls, e.g., through the media. Second, they have to internalize 
them, and third, they have to consider them when forming opinions or casting 
their vote (McAllister & Studlar, 1991, p. 723). Yet little is known about voters’ 
capacity to recall poll results accurately and what factors influence this ability. 
This question matters for two key reasons. First, individual differences in poll 
recall might clarify why behavioral effects of polls are mostly observed in 
experimental, not observational, settings (Hardmeier, 2008). Compared to 
forced-exposure laboratory situations, in real life polls might be barely noticed, 
superficially perceived, or simply not remembered. People may have insuffi-
cient cognitive or motivational capacity or may forget poll results after they 
have informed their attitudes or behavior. Second, individual differences in 
poll recall accuracy might lead to varying and even irrational political deci-
sions, especially when polls are used to inform strategic voting (Gschwend, 
2007; Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2012).
We address this gap by looking at people’s ability to accurately recall the 
standings of parties in the polls, asking (1) Do people recall published polls, 
and if they do, how accurate are their judgements? and (2) What are the 
factors influencing this accuracy? Drawing from relevant literature, we 
propose that increased poll exposure increases accuracy, but so do higher 
levels of general political knowledge and interest in the election. We also 
acknowledge the possibility that sociodemographic factors and partisan 
considerations might have an effect. Since demographics are known corre-
lates of political information acquisition in general, this might apply to 
more specific information types such as poll recall. Partisan preferences, 
meanwhile, may skew people’s perceptions in favor of their preferred 
parties. Our analysis is based on a regionally representative survey carried 
out in Berlin in the lead up to the 2013 German national election. Although 
increased exposure did not drastically increase the accuracy of recall, it was 
associated with an improved ability to rank the parties according to their 
standings in the polls. Political knowledge consistently and strongly pre-
dicted accurate poll perceptions, while interest in the election did not. We 
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propose potential reasons for, and implications of, these and other findings 
in the discussion section.
Are people likely to remember poll results?
Polls have at least two characteristics that potentially limit people’s ability to 
remember them. First, their results are prone to continuous change, parti-
cularly because public opinion can be volatile between and within election 
campaigns. Second, poll results represent only one specific aspect of cam-
paign information. Given the constraints of information processing, both 
characteristics should make it difficult for most people to recall poll results 
(Lang, 2000). Empirical work on the recollection of mediated information 
seems to support this assumption. When reading news reports (Graber, 
2001) or watching television news (Neuman, 1976), most people store only 
general meanings, while specific details are erased from memory. Therefore, 
“inaccurate, incomplete recall of political and other stories . . . should be 
expected as the norm, rather than considered to be the exception” and 
“recallable knowledge is likely to be eclectic and sparse . . . and often error- 
prone” (Graber, 2001, p. 14). Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that 
most citizens hold rather rough impressions of political majorities or 
minorities instead of remembering the exact polling numbers.
However, people are exposed to polls very frequently – especially during 
election campaigns – and do appear to be quite attentive to them. In 1996, 
55% of US adults said that they follow public opinion polls at least occa-
sionally (Traugott & Kang, 2000). Similarly, in the UK in 1979, 1983, and 
1987, two thirds of the population said that they had seen an opinion poll 
“in the last few days” (McAllister & Studlar, 1991). In Germany, in 2005, 
only 8% of the population indicated that they never noticed public opinion 
polls during the course of the national election (Faas & Schmitt-Beck, 2007) 
and in 2013, one day before the election, 70% said that they had seen polls 
within the past week (Partheymüller & Schäfer, 2013).
Despite the empirical insights on poll exposure, much less is known 
about whether people are able to remember the results. Research in the area 
dates back to the 1990s or earlier, when published polls were far less 
widespread than today (Brettschneider, 2008). This is somewhat surprising 
since recall should be a central antecedent for behavioral and attitudinal 
poll effects – both subject to extensive empirical investigation (Barnfield, 
2019; Moy & Rinke, 2012) and normative debate (Donsbach, 2001). Studies 
in poll effects rely on the (often implicit) assumption that people base their 
political attitudes and behavior on the perceived public support for political 
parties or candidates and that polls provide an important cue for their 
judgments (Mutz, 1997). However, as with any type of political knowledge 
or assessment, individual notions of who is currently leading or trailing 
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may vary across citizens. As a result, differences in actual poll recall could 
prompt different behaviors.
The few studies conducted so far differ in their methodological design and 
the level of detail provided by their measures, making it difficult to draw 
general conclusions. Whereas most use categorical recall measures, either 
asking for the currently leading party (McAllister & Studlar, 1991) or candidate 
(Lavrakas et al., 1991), only one asks for exact percentages (Babad, 1997). In 
a nationally representative survey conducted by Lavrakas et al. (1991), 95% of 
Americans correctly identified George Bush as the candidate leading according 
to the polls. In Israel, Babad (1997) found that close to election day, 30% of 
participants said that they know the results of the latest polls. However, less 
than half were accurate in their judgments. McAllister and Studlar (1991) 
report that most of their British respondents were able to correctly identify 
the currently leading party during the 1983 and 1987 general elections.
Reflecting the limited knowledge on this issue and the different mea-
surement approaches employed so far, we pose our first research question, 
which differentiates between both existing measures. 
RQ1: How well are voters able to remember the relative rankings of the 
parties taking part in an election, and their individual shares, according to 
the polls?
What makes people more likely to remember poll results?
Compared to people’s ability to recall polls, even less is known about the 
factors that might influence this ability. In fact, none of the aforementioned 
studies consider this. We therefore pose a second question, again distin-
guishing between the two types of recall. 
RQ2: What factors are associated with better recall of the relative rankings, 
and individual vote shares, of parties reported in the polls?
Since poll results are a specific form of information people can learn 
about during a campaign, research on the acquisition of political informa-
tion provides a reasonable starting point in identifying factors that might 
affect poll recall. Probably the most obvious factor is exposure. Its positive 
effect on memory is long supported by research on learning (Crowder, 
2014). Yet while some studies show positive effects of media consumption 
on political knowledge (e.g., Wei & Lo, 2008), others do not, particularly 
when they control for attention paid to media content (Liu & Eveland, 
2005; Luskin, 1990). Still others even observe negative effects of certain 
media (Van Erkel & Van Aelst, 2020). Some scholars have argued that the 
weak effects of exposure could be explained by how it is measured, 
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particularly when merely asking how frequently people use certain media 
(e.g., newspapers). In such cases, it often remains unclear whether the 
information supposed to lead to a specific type of knowledge (e.g., polls) 
is actually part of the content consumed. Measuring a specific type of 
information exposure might be more suitable in this regard (Ohme et al., 
2016). We therefore hypothesize that poll exposure should be positively 
associated to poll recall.1 
H1: Voters exposed to polls more frequently will recall (a) poll rankings and 
(b) shares more accurately.
Poll results typically reach citizens through the media. However, numerous 
studies have shown that audiences recall little information presented in the 
news (Graber, 1988; Neuman, 1976). Learning abilities, motivations to use 
media, the attention paid during reception, and the cognitive and/or inter-
personal elaboration of the information received can affect learning (Eveland, 
2001; Price & Czilli, 1996). These ideas have been conceptualized and con-
firmed empirically in the context of the cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 
2001), but similar arguments also show up in models of mediated information 
processing (Lang, 2000) and attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
Motivation represents a major driving force of learning about political 
matters (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Eveland, 2001; Luskin, 1990). If 
voters are not interested in an election, they might not turn to political 
coverage in the first place. Even if exposed to political news, a lack of 
“surveillance motivation” (Eveland, 2001) or more specific motivations 
(David, 2009) may reduce their attention to media content, the likelihood 
of elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and the storage of information in 
memory (Lang, 2000). In line with this, campaign interest has been shown 
to be a strong predictor of political learning, even if other factors are 
controlled for (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Elenbaas et al., 2014; Liu & 
Eveland, 2005). This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Voters more interested in the election will recall poll rankings (a) and 
shares (b) more accurately.
Apart from motivation, ability is also considered an important precon-
dition for learning – sometimes conceptualized as intelligence (Luskin, 
1It is not likely that seeing multiple different polls will lead people to remember the 
results of one specific poll more accurately. However, those who see more polls, 
when asked to recall the picture these polls gave them, should have a better idea of 
the average rankings and shares of the parties. This also depends on how similar the 
results of different polls are.
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1990) or as prior political knowledge (Nadeau et al., 2008). We follow Zaller 
(1992) in considering generalized political knowledge, “a measure of gen-
eral, chronic awareness . . . assuming that persons who are knowledgeable 
about politics in general are habitually attentive to communications on 
most particular issues as well.” Indeed, several studies have shown that 
prior knowledge has a major impact on information acquisition (Elenbaas 
et al., 2014; Eveland et al., 2003; Nadeau et al., 2008). There are several 
reasons for this (Zaller, 1992): knowledgeable voters will pay more attention 
to campaign coverage because political information is meaningful and 
important to them; they will be exposed to politically relevant information 
more often; and they will have a higher ability to understand, systematically 
process, and organize this information, and incorporate it into preexisting 
knowledge structures (Eveland et al., 2003; Luskin, 1990). We therefore 
expect preexisting knowledge to have a similar effect here: 
H3: Politically knowledgeable voters will recall poll rankings (a) and shares 
(b) more accurately than those less knowledgeable.
Prior research has identified further factors influencing knowledge 
acquisition in election campaigns (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). While 
age proves to be relevant only occasionally (Liu & Eveland, 2005), effects of 
gender are more consistent, suggesting that men tend to learn more than 
women when it comes to political facts and figures (Drew & Weaver, 2006; 
Elenbaas et al., 2014). Research suggests, however, that this supposed 
gender gap is largely an artifact of how political knowledge is measured 
(Lizotte & Sidman, 2009; Mondak & Anderson, 2004). Education tends to 
foster knowledge and learning (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2005; Liu & 
Eveland, 2005), although there are exceptions (Luskin, 1990). In one of 
the few studies measuring poll recall, Babad (1997) did not find differences 
in recall accuracy due to age, gender, or education.
Another factor discussed in the context of poll recall is partisanship. Scholars 
have speculated that poll recall may undergo a “wishful thinking-like” effect 
(Babad, 1997, p. 119) – a tendency of beliefs, typically electoral expectations, to 
vary in an optimistic direction as a function of political preferences (Krizan et al., 
2010; Miller et al., 2012). Drawing from motivated reasoning theory (Kunda, 
1990), they assume that people may recall higher poll shares for their preferred 
party or candidate, because it serves to achieve certain “directional” goals. 
Supporting this, Babad (1997) found that partisan Israeli respondents recalled 
slightly higher percentages for their own parties – even though published polls at 
the time showed identical results. Donsbach (2001) reported comparable results 
from a survey during the 1976 German national election in which partisans 
tended to declare “their” party as the current leader. Somewhat contrary to the 
previous studies, Meffert et al. (2011) found that persons with a strong leaning 
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toward a certain party recalled recent poll results more accurately.2 Taken 
together, these findings suggest that it is appropriate to account for age, gender, 
education and party attachments in explaining poll recall.
Data and method
A representative CATI telephone survey of 1,012 Berlin citizens during the 
2013 German national election provides the basis of our analyses.3 Two weeks 
before the election on September 22, respondents were interviewed and asked 
about their general interest in the election, political knowledge, party prefer-
ences, poll exposure, poll recall and socio-demographic characteristics. Before 
the interview started, participants’ consent to take part in the study was 
obtained. All participants were informed about the goal of the survey, that 
their data would be anonymized and only used for scientific purposes. 
Wording of all relevant questions is detailed in Appendix 7, with more details 
on the survey and the sampling process available in Appendix 8.
Dependent variables
We focus on two dependent variables: generic recall of party rankings in the 
polls and recall of specific party shares in the polls. To capture rank recall, 
respondents were asked to rank the seven parties taking part in the election 
according to their positions in the polls. If a respondent, for example, 
correctly identified the CDU to be the leading party, he or she was coded 
“1.” All other ranks, as well as “don’t know” responses were regarded 
incorrect and coded “0.”4 Responses for all parties were summed up to 
indicate the total number of correctly ranked parties for each respondent.
To capture percentage recall, respondents indicated the vote intention 
shares of the parties according to the current polls. Absolute deviations 
from the actual poll results were calculated individually using the polls 
available at the time of the interview. For example, if the CDU’s average 
2Although the study focuses on the accuracy of electoral expectations, the accuracy 
measure used captures if “an individual prediction was supported by the polls” at the 
time of the survey (Meffert et al., 2011, p. 808).
3Data and code are available here: https://osf.io/75rd4/.
4Because our interest is in determining what affects how many parties people rank 
correctly, both “don’t know” responses (DKs) and an incorrect ranking can be deemed 
as a failure to do this. Appendix 2 reports a model in which observations with DKs for 
any of the first five parties are removed. Effects on their ability to correctly rank these 
five parties (versus incorrectly ranking them) are weaker than those observed in the 
main text, but this is of course based on a smaller sample and effect sizes have 
a lower upper bound because fewer parties are considered. Removing DKs on all 
seven parties would have resulted in a sample size too small for any informative 
analysis.
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share in the polls was 42%, and a participant recalled a share of 44% or 
40%, in either case he or she would be assigned a deviation score of 2 (more 
details in Appendix 6).
Table 1 shows the published results as reported by the six largest German 
polling organizations (Allensbach, TNS Emnid, Infratest dimap, Forsa, 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (FGW), and INSA) three weeks before the 
election (the week before the survey). Importantly, the six companies 
came up with almost identical results regarding the population’s current 
vote intentions. Respondents were therefore exposed to a homogenous poll 
environment. This is crucial, because our analyses necessarily focus on 
averages across these polls. If the polling environment showed more het-
erogeneity, these average measures would not be suitable benchmarks for 
accuracy of “recall.” Without knowing exactly which poll each respondent 
saw, measuring averages is the closest we can come to measuring recall, but 
Table 1 shows this is a good proxy for poll recall as no polls considerably 
diverged from these averages.
Polls were not only constant; they also drew a clear picture: The CDU 
dominated the campaign by a mean share of 40.1%, followed by the SPD 
(25.8%) with a 15-percentage point gap separating the two. The Green Party 
(10.8%) and the Left (8.4%) were almost equally strong. The FDP (5.3%) 
and the newcomer AfD (3.1%) were rather weak, as were the Pirates (2.7%), 
but still interesting cases because polls saw them very close to the election 
threshold of five percent.
Independent variables
To measure poll exposure, participants indicated how often they had come 
across polls in the media the week before the interview using a five-point 
scale ranging from 1 “never” to 5 “very often”. Only 67 respondents (6.6%) 
reported that they “never” came across election polls. To measure interest in 
the campaign, respondents were asked how important the upcoming 
Table 1. Comparison of the pre-election polls published by the six major polling 
organizations (% vote intention).
Forsa Allensbach TNS Emnid FGW Infratest dimap INSA Mean
CDU 39.6 40.0 40.0 41.0 40.8 39.0 40.1
SPD 23.8 25.0 25.0 26.0 27.2 27.7 25.8
Green 10.2 12.5 11.0 10.1 10.0 11.3 10.8
Left 9.4 7.5 9.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.4
FDP 5.4 6.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 4.1 5.3
AfD 3.6 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.1
Pirates 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.1 3.0 3.0 2.7
Source: www.wahlrecht.de. 
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election was for them (also using a five-point scale). Voters’ political knowl-
edge was measured by four questions on general German political knowl-
edge resulting in a summed scale of correct answers. To measure the 
strength of party preferences, we asked participants, again on a five-point 
scale, to express their overall opinion of each party, from very negative to 
very positive. Scores were recoded to represent distance from the scale’s 
midpoint, for every party, such that a neutral opinion is represented as 1, 
a slight like or dislike as 2, a strong like or dislike represented as 3, and no 
expressed opinion as 0. Summing these scores resulted in an overall indi-
cator of partisan sentiment strength irrespective of specific partisan 
identity.5 In the case of generic rank recall, we adjust for this summated 
score, expecting that those with higher values will be generally less accurate 
in their recall owing to the bias induced by strong, polarized party 
preferences.6 For the specific party vote share recall models, we simply 
control for the five-point scale item recording preferences toward the 
specific party – those who like this party more should overstate its share. 
Standard measures of age, gender and level of education are also included 
as controls.
To test the effects of our predictors on the rank recall and percentage 
recall outcomes, we fit several linear regression models. Where the 
predictors are on ordinal scales, we follow recently proposed best prac-
tices in assessing their effects as “monotonic” in a flexible Bayesian 
framework (Bürkner & Charpentier, 2020). This approach is specifically 
tailored to modeling the effects of ordinal predictors, describing these 
intuitively as follows: there is an average change in the outcome asso-
ciated with every one-unit change in the predictor, but the expected 
difference between any two adjacent categories, as a proportion of the 
5We also ran a version of the analyses using item response theory (IRT) instead of 
summated scales in every case that they were used. The results were comparable. Xu 
and Stone (2012) suggest that the summated scores approach is often preferable in 
simple applications such as this, as it requires fewer assumptions.
6We do this because it is not clear how preferences for any specific party should affect 
overall recall (Meffert et al., 2011, p. 809). For example, although we might expect 
someone who likes the SPD to incorrectly rank it in first place, it is not clear that their 
overall ranking ability would change much beyond this, especially when compared to 
someone who dislikes the SPD and therefore ranks it lower. In both cases, we would 
expect these voters to rank two parties incorrectly. Nonetheless, Appendix 1 reports 
results when controlling for the opinion toward each party individually, instead of 
the summated score. The results of all main effects are comparable. Appendix 4 
reports results regarding the ability to correctly rank each party individually for our 
three main parties of interest. Here, we instead use the indicator of feelings toward 
the relevant party because wishful thinking should be targeted toward that party. 
Results suggest that wishful thinking effects are minimal at best or—if they are 
present—are canceled out by people who dislike the party by ranking it too low.
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overall effect, can vary. We fit these models using the Bayesian brms 
package in R (Bürkner, 2017).7
Here we report the results of four models in total. The first is the rank 
recall model, which is generic in that it captures how many parties the 
individual correctly ranked, rather than focusing on any specific party. 
The second, third and fourth models focus on the CDU, the SPD and the 
FDP, capturing the absolute deviation between their average shares in the 
polls and the score assigned to them by the individual, among those 
individuals who reported a score. We select the CDU and SPD because 
they were the two strongest parties throughout the campaign. Although 
neither of them was able to achieve an absolute majority in the polls, they 
nevertheless represented the opinion of the largest segments of the electo-
rate. Additionally, we include the FDP, representing a party which tradi-
tionally acts as a potential coalition partner and because polls put it very 
close to the election threshold of five percent. Both circumstances made it 
an ideal candidate for strategic voting. We also fit equivalent models for the 




Firstly, in terms of RQ1, Table 2 presents the percentages of respondents 
who remembered each of the parties’ ranks accurately. Clearly, ranking the 
largest parties accurately was much easier than ranking the smaller ones. 
This is perhaps unsurprising given that the differences between these 
parties’ shares are (in absolute terms) much smaller than those between 
the larger parties. Overall, this represents a reasonably good level of recall, 
with the majority of respondents correctly ranking the two major parties. It 
is also worth noting that, in asking the question, interviewers did not 
specifically name parties for the respondent to rank and asked for further 
parties only once when respondents did not mention additional parties 
Table 2. Percentage of respondents able to correctly rank each party’s position in 
recent pre-election polls. N = 945.















7The priors used in these models are conservative and weakly informative. See 
Appendix 9 for more details.
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(e.g., “And the second-best party?”). It is likely that, had the interviewer 
read out each party’s name in turn, ranking performance could have 
increased, if even by guesswork.
Turning to RQ2, the key results of the rank recall model are pre-
sented in Figure 1.8 The first three plots show the predicted number of 
correctly ranked parties, and 95% confidence intervals, across the range 
of each of the three main independent variables: poll exposure, political 
knowledge, and interest in the election. In the case of poll exposure and 
election interest, these relationships are not strictly linear, because the 
change in the outcome associated with each increase in the predictor is 
allowed to vary at different levels. The final, bottom-right plot captures 
the average change in the number of correctly ranked parties associated 
with each predictor.
Figure 1. Results of generic poll rank recall model.
8We also modeled the correct rankings as binomially distributed, but the estimated 
effects for the main parameters were equivalent to those in the linear regression 
model, so we focus on these here for ease of interpretation. The main results of the 
binomial models are reported in Appendix 3.
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Top left/right/bottom left: change in predicted number of correctly ranked 
parties (line) as poll exposure/knowledge/interest increases, with 95% con-
fidence intervals (shaded region). Bottom right: average expected change in 
number of correctly ranked parties associated with each predictor (points) 
and 95% confidence interval (bars). 
These results support H1(a) and H3(a): those who have been exposed to 
more polls and those who are more politically knowledgeable are generally 
able to accurately recall the ranks of more parties in the polls. Looking first 
at poll exposure, this relationship is clearly positive, but also slightly 
different at different levels of exposure. For example, the slope between 
having seen polls “often” and “very often” is slightly flatter than between 
seeing them “rarely” and “sometimes”. In other words, there is a point at 
which the marginal gain of seeing more polls starts to decrease. On average, 
this effect is positive: the expected gain in the number of correctly ranked 
parties brought about by increased exposure is approximately 0.2–0.4.
The linear effect of political knowledge is also positive, and more 
strongly so. Those who answered one additional political knowledge ques-
tion correctly are expected on average to have a correct ranking score 
almost 0.5 points higher, such that those with the highest levels of political 
knowledge rank on average almost two more parties correctly. This suggests 
that the politically more knowledgeable, independently of how avidly they 
follow the polls, are considerably better able to recall how the parties stand 
relative to each other.
The results provide little support for H2(a), given that increased interest 
in the election is not convincingly associated with a better ability to 
correctly rank the parties. This, again, varies at different levels of interest, 
but at no point is the relationship particularly pronounced. The model 
summary does, however, indicate that those with higher levels of education 
are better at ranking the parties, net of other effects. Those who are better 
educated learn well from information even when exposure to polls and 
general political knowledge are controlled for. Men, on average, also cor-
rectly ranked significantly more parties than women. The discussion section 
below suggests potential reasons for why this might emerge here – notably, 
the so-called “guessing effect” (Lizotte & Sidman, 2009).
Percentage recall accuracy
Turning to percentage recall, in terms of RQ1, a first point to note is that 
a reasonably large proportion of respondents could not recall specific party 
vote shares at all. Approximately 72% of respondents could recall a vote 
share for the CDU, 71% for the SPD, and 62% for the FDP. However, 
Figure 2 shows that those who recalled a share did so with considerable 
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accuracy, coming very close to the parties’ average in recent polls. The 
modal deviation is either 0–1% (CDU and FDP) or 1–2% (SPD). 
Predictably, there is greater absolute deviation for the CDU and the SPD 
than for the FDP, given the FDP had a vote share much closer to zero, not 
only limiting the extent to which people could understate its share, but also 
making it unlikely they would mistakenly think it is polling extremely well. 
Figure 2 also shows that despite the relatively high accuracy found in the 
aggregate, there is still variance at the individual level.
Returning to RQ2, Figures 3, 4 and 5 present the results of the percen-
tage recall models for each of the three parties in an attempt to explain this 
variability. These take the same form as Figure 1, but this time greater 
accuracy is captured by negative relationships, since they represent a trend 
toward less deviation from the correct percentages. Those who were 
exposed to polls more frequently appear to recall each party’s vote share 
Figure 2. Distribution of deviation from each party’s correct average vote share, 
among those who were able to recall a vote share.
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slightly more accurately on average, but this effect is never discernible from 
zero. Moreover, the slopes are consistently flat, indicating little variation in 
this null effect at different levels of exposure. There is therefore minimal 
support for H1(b).
Top left/right/bottom left: change in predicted absolute deviation from accu-
rate recall (line) as poll exposure/knowledge/interest increases, with 95% 
confidence intervals (shaded region). Bottom right: average expected change 
in absolute deviation from accurate recall associated with each predictor 
(points) and 95% confidence interval (bars). 
Political knowledge, meanwhile, continues to be a good predictor of recall 
accuracy for the CDU’s and the SPD’s vote shares, although not for the FDP. 
The most politically knowledgeable tended to be, on average, within two 
percentage points of the correct CDU vote share, and approximately two 
percentage points closer than the least knowledgeable. This effect is even 
stronger for the SPD, for whom the least knowledgeable tend to recall vote 
shares around six percentage points off the correct share, while the most 
knowledgeable tend to be accurate to within two percent. This is supportive of 
Figure 3. Results of CDU percentage recall model.
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H3(b). Again, it suggests that those who are politically aware are able to recall 
the relative standing of the parties well, independent of their attention to polls. 
For the FDP, the least knowledgeable and the most knowledgeable tend to be 
within around one to two percentage points of the correct share. This is likely 
to be due to the fact that the FDP’s vote share is itself consistently below 
five percent, leaving little room for deviation.
Top left/right/bottom left: change in predicted absolute deviation from accu-
rate recall (line) as poll exposure/knowledge/interest increases, with 95% 
confidence intervals (shaded region). Bottom right: average expected change 
in absolute deviation from accurate recall associated with each predictor 
(points) and 95% confidence interval (bars). 
In none of the three cases does interest in the election campaign strongly 
influence recall accuracy, when controlling for alternative explanations, so 
there is little support for H2(b). Only in the case of the CDU is this 
relationship even in the hypothesized direction. It appears that interest in 
itself does not lead to more accurate recall when accounting for the fact that 
Figure 4. Results of SPD percentage recall model.
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the more interested might also be more likely to see polls, and more 
knowledgeable in general.
Education tends to foster more accurate recall, but only convincingly so for 
the SPD. Gender, however, is again strongly influential. Men are consistently 
more likely to give accurate percentages, by approximately one percent for 
both the CDU and SPD, and by just under half a percent for the FDP. This 
could again be partly due to a “guessing effect” (Lizotte & Sidman, 2009). For 
all three parties, the more someone likes that party, the less accurate they tend 
to be, suggesting the presence of a wishful thinking-like effect, but this effect is 
not confidently greater than zero. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that the 
models measure absolute deviation in recall. As well as those who like the 
party overstating its share, those who dislike the party might understate its 
share. These effects can cancel out in absolute terms. Partly for this reason, 
Figure 5. Results of FDP percentage recall model. Top left/right/bottom left: change in 
predicted absolute deviation from accurate recall (line) as poll exposure/knowledge/ 
interest increases, with 95% confidence intervals (shaded region). Bottom right: 
average expected change in absolute deviation from accurate recall associated with 
each predictor (points) and 95% confidence interval (bars).
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below we encourage further research employing more fine-grained strategies 
to measure wishful thinking in poll recall.
Discussion
Our results show that voters are able to recall poll results quite well. 
Respondents who had seen polls tended to correctly recall the currently 
leading parties, whereas they struggled more to rank the smaller ones 
relative to each other. The same pattern could be observed for exact vote 
shares, in that the majority was able to indicate a specific share for the 
leading parties, whereas most of them failed to do so for the smaller ones. 
However, those who recalled a party-specific vote share tended to do so 
quite accurately. In addition, people’s recall ability depended on several 
factors. We found that increased exposure to polls led to a more accurate 
ranking of the parties according to their relative standings in recent polls, 
but that this did not markedly improve their ability to accurately recall 
the vote shares of these parties. This effect did not vary much depending 
on the level of exposure: the difference between those who saw polls 
“often” and “sometimes” was generally very close to that between those 
who saw them “rarely” and “sometimes,” for example. For rank recall 
though, there was some suggestion that the effect started to tail off as 
people went from seeing polls “often” to “very often.”
Generalized political knowledge was consistently associated with more 
accurate recall of party rankings and vote shares, suggesting that the 
politically knowledgeable are also able to recall how much support the 
parties enjoy – regardless of how closely they are following the polls. The 
only exception to this is the FDP, for which deviations from accurate 
percentage recall are limited by the fact that its vote share is so close to 
zero. Hence, constant poll exposure may not be a necessary condition for 
accurate poll recall for those who are politically knowledgeable.
Net of these effects, interest in the election had no discernible indepen-
dent influence on accuracy. This does not necessarily suggest that those 
who are more interested do not tend to recall polls better. Rather, if this is 
the case, it could be that their recall is better because those who are more 
interested in an election are also (perhaps as a result) more politically 
knowledgeable and exposed to more polls. A further possibility is that our 
measure of interest in the election simply does not capture variance in 
political interest very well. Most respondents reported that the outcome of 
the election was rather important or very important to them, such that 
variability in interest might be captured better by levels of political knowl-
edge, or indeed poll exposure.
Beyond these main findings, we also found that education tended to 
foster poll recall accuracy, speaking to the assertion that the more educated 
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learn more from political information (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2005). While 
age did not affect recall, gender was consistently important: men tended to 
give more accurate assessments than women. This is consistent with 
empirical indications of a gender gap in political knowledge, which is 
most likely partly illusive. One prominently suggested reason is that 
women are simply less likely to guess in answering questions for which 
they are uncertain (Lizotte & Sidman, 2009; Mondak & Anderson, 2004), 
while some men will get the answer right even when they are uncertain. In 
the rank recall model, this would translate into men potentially correctly 
ranking more parties than women, who are less likely to hazard a guess 
preventing them getting this answer right. The fact that this difference is 
robust to the effect of election interest, poll exposure and political knowl-
edge suggests that it is not due to confounding with any of these measures. 
Future research could seek to explore these dynamics more directly in the 
case of learning from polls.
Finally, our results do not suggest a strong effect of partisanship on poll 
recall. We nonetheless think that further investigation of this is worth-
while, partly because our approach is arguably unlikely to detect any such 
effects. Partisan effects are unlikely to be strong in generic rank recall, and 
the choice to focus on absolute deviations in percentage recall potentially 
masks countervailing effects among partisans and nonpartisans. Also, pre-
ference-induced differences in poll recall still may occur at different levels 
of the communication process. On the one hand, they could result from 
mere selective exposure (e.g., Lodge & Taber, 2013; Stroud, 2008) in that 
citizens tend to consume polls that reflect their own political preferences. 
In this case poll recall would differ simply because of the information 
people have been exposed to. This could also explain why in our case, 
the effects of political preferences were relatively small. Since poll results 
during the 2013 election were nearly identical across the main polling 
organizations, selective exposure could not have led to major individual 
differences in the poll information people received. On the other hand, 
political preferences could also affect the way in which (identical) polling 
information is processed and evaluated. Motivated reasoning theory 
(Kunda, 1990) suggests, that people’s cognitive processing of polls also 
depends on their individual motivations or goals. Hence, even in situations 
where people encounter the same polls and recall results in an unbiased 
manner, they might still indicate different numbers, because they weight 
polls differently depending on whether they help them achieve their 
“directional” motivations. Recent studies have shown that people view 
polls as less credible when the poll result contradicted their own view, 
(for example, Kuru et al., 2017; Madson & Hillygus, 2020) while the 
ideological alignment of the news source does not seem to influence 
perceived poll credibility (Kuru et al., 2017). Disentangling the potential 
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sources and mechanisms of poll selection and processing is demanding, 
perhaps evidenced by the very negligible effects of partisan sentiment 
found in our analyses, but it is nevertheless a promising task for future 
research. In addition to the effects of partisanship on poll processing, 
cognitive availability of poll results might also depend on the timing of 
poll publication, with possible primacy and/or recency effects on the side 
of the recipient.
The generalizability of our findings might be limited by the geographical 
and election context. Berlin, as the country’s political center with a particularly 
rich media environment, could have made it more likely for its citizens to 
encounter polls compared to other regions. Similarly, Germany as a multi- 
party system with an electoral threshold and the possibility of forming party 
coalitions could make poll information more relevant and useful for citizens, 
leading to increased consumption of polls. We also have to consider the 
specific situation during the 2013 election where poll coverage was rather 
intensive (Reinemann & Zerback, 2017). We can therefore assume that even 
moderately interested voters were exposed at least to basic poll information. 
Moreover, the pronounced poll homogeneity during the 2013 campaign might 
not be a typical scenario. Since modern media environments provide polling 
information from various sources (Rosenstiel, 2005), citizens might end up 
with very different notions of the current state of the race depending on their 
individual media consumption. Selective reporting of poll results that match 
the political leanings of partisan media outlets (Tremayne, 2015) or are used to 
tell a certain story of the campaign race (Rosenstiel, 2005) further contribute to 
such a heterogenous polling environment. Such variations in published polls 
could result in a situation where citizens increasingly turn to congenial poll 
results.
In addition, even in non-election periods polls have become a standard 
feature of political reporting. This means that even people following poli-
tical coverage only occasionally or only immediately before the election 
might still be able to guess at the parties’ popularity rankings. For example, 
the CDU has been the leading political party in Germany for years and 
most citizens should know that.
Finally, our study did not investigate further consequences of poll recall. 
We do not know, for example, whether the accuracy of poll recall is related 
to the susceptibility for poll effects on voting behavior. It seems plausible to 
assume that voters who consider poll results in their voting decisions will 
do so by relying on the numbers they remember, which are not necessarily 
those actually reported. As a result, strategic voting decisions may be based 
on inaccurate premises. Our results also indicate that more politically 
knowledgeable citizens tend to have more accurate notions of current 
standing in the polls and therefore are less prone to such errors regarding 
their strategic decisions based on polls. Analyzing this potentially mediating 
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role of poll recall when it comes to the effects of polls on voting decisions 
could be another promising path for future research. Similarly, future 
research could examine the potentially mediating role of general political 
knowledge in the acquisition of poll knowledge. Since the use of specific 
media is known to exert a positive effect on political knowledge in general 
(Dimitrova et al., 2014), positive indirect effects on poll recall are also 
possible.
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